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1. Introduction 
What is the correlation between taxes and the wealth of a nation? Payroll tax encourages workers 
to increase their leisure and reduce their labor; corporate income taxes deter entrepreneurship and 
investment, which leads to fewer new jobs; and sales taxes dissuade consumption, the main component 
of the aggregate demand.  
From this, one would expect a negative relationship between taxes and the wealth of a nation; 
however, we must take into account the positive impact of public expenditures as well. What the 
government can give back to the economy through the provision of public goods can more than make 
up for the drain of private resources: A fine system of police, justice and external defenses grants the 
security on which the market mechanisms are founded. An effective system of firemen and cleaning 
services can raise the value of property which also impacts positively on public welfare. 
Hence, the final correlation between the amount of taxes imposed and the wealth of a nation is in 
theory ambiguous, and it depends on the extend the government uses the tax collected to give back in a 
way that the people could not have agreed alone, rather than spend it in the maintenance of the 
government itself.  
As the title states, in this paper I will carry out a cross-sectional study among 114 countries to 
elucidate on the effect taxes (on corporate income and on sales, in particular) have on the wealth of a 
nation (measured by the Human Development Index and the Gross Domestic Product per capita at 
purchasing power parity). Additional regressions will be run after that to check for omitted variable bias. 
These models will include the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index and the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI). Before doing all the statistical analysis though, I will describe taxes briefly. 
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2. On taxes. 
The corporate income tax is one levied on the earnings of a corporation. The purpose of taxing them 
besides the individuals is to tax the earnings of the owners of capital that might otherwise escape 
taxation. The sales tax is the general one paid by consumers to vendors at the point of sale (compared 
to the excise tax which is the additional consumption tax on particular goods).  
In Economics, the corporate income tax is said to be a direct one, as it directly taxes an individual 
resource (i.e. it may be adjusted to the individual characteristics of the taxpayer); while the sales tax is 
said to be an indirect one, as it taxes the use of the resource rather than the resource itself (i.e. they are 
levied on transactions irrespective of the circumstances of the buyer and seller). 
Two key concepts describe the set of tax rates on income, whether individual or corporate: The first 
is the marginal tax rate, which is the percentage of the next dollar of income that is paid in taxes. The 
second concept is the average tax rate, which is the percentage of total income that is paid in taxes (i.e. 
the ratio of total tax payments to total income). Another important distinction is the tax incidence (i.e. 
who bears the true burden of a tax). Statutory incidence tells which party sends the check to the 
government (e.g. the vendor in the case of the sales tax), while economic or effective incidence concerns 
about which party actually “pays” the tax (e.g. the buyer in the same example). 
In 2001, the total government of the United States (i.e. the federal, state and local governments) got 
most of its tax revenue from individual income (42.3%), followed by payroll (24.6%) and consumption 
(16.1%). Corporate income only meant 6.5% of its total revenue, although the top marginal bracket for 
the corporate-income-tax rate reaches up to 50%; while the highest sales-tax rate (state plus federal) is 
of only 10.3%. This is consistent with Arthur Laffer’s argument that not necessarily the tax with the 
highest rate will provide the highest revenue. Most governments in the world have consumption as their 
main source of tax revenue, where in developing countries revenue from individual income tax is almost 
non-existent. 
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Vertical and horizontal equity are the two distributional goals considered in measuring the fairness 
of a tax: the former states that groups with more resources should pay higher taxes than groups with 
fewer resources; whereas the latter states that similar individuals who make different economic choices 
should be treated similarly by the tax system. 
When discussing over the vertical equality, three classifications fall upon taxes: whether they are 
progressive, proportional or regressive. A tax is progressive if its average rate rises with income; 
proportional if it stays the same; and regressive if the average rate actually decreases with increases in 
income. If we measure income not in Accounting terms but under the Haig-Simons comprehensive 
definition (where taxable resources are the change in individual’s power to consume during the year, 
plus any increases in the person’s stock of wealth), then income would be measured as an ability to pay, 
thus changing our classification of taxes (e.g. a proportional sales tax could be considered regressive as 
people with low income have a higher propensity to consume, and a proportional income tax could 
already be considered progressive without needing to recur to brackets). 
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3. Cross-Sectional Analysis. 
As we can see in Table 3.1, the mean and median corporate income tax around the world is about 
25%, with a corresponding value of 16% for sales tax
1
. The distribution of income tax is almost 
symmetric while the sales tax is skewed to the left. The coefficient of variability is less than 40% in both 
cases.  
Table 3.1: Summary statistics, using the observations 1 - 114 
(missing values were skipped) 
 
                           Mean         Median        Minimum        Maximum 
Corporate_Income         0.25289        0.25000        0.00000        0.50000 
Sales_Tax                0.15974        0.17500        0.00000        0.25500 
HDI                    0.70913        0.73200        0.28200        0.93800 
Real_GDP_per_cap         17686.         12775.         412.00         81466. 
 
                       Std. Dev.          C.V.        Skewness   Ex. kurtosis 
Corporate_Income       0.087559        0.34624      -0.0041105        0.26199 
Sales_Tax              0.058089        0.36364        -0.75708        0.18598 
HDI                  0.15348         0.21643        -0.88462        0.19868 
Real_GDP_per_cap       15283.          0.86415          1.2022         1.4968 
 
 
As we can see in Table 3.2, there is a low correlation between corporate income tax and sales tax, 
and both have a low correlation with Real GDP per capita. By low I mean below the 5% critical value 
necessary to state that they are significantly different from zero at this confidence level. Compared to 
the HDI they fared better but still around this critical value. Only the correlation between HDI and Real 
GDP per capita was strong, but that is not in the scope of this paper.
2
  
Table 3.2: Correlation Coefficients, using the observations 1 - 114 
(missing values were skipped) 
 
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.1937 for n = 103 
 
 Corporate_Income    Sales_Tax     HDI     Real_GDP_per_cap 
          1.0000        0.0150    -0.2067         -0.0267  Corporate_Income 
                        1.0000     0.1863          0.0417  Sales_Tax 
                                   1.0000          0.7772  HDI 
                                                   1.0000  Real_GDP_per_cap 
                                                          
1
 Corporate_Income is measured as its marginal tax bracket. Both variables, Sales_Tax and Corporate_Income, take 
the maximum values of each country, which includes federal, state and local taxes. So -for example- for the case of 
the United States, we get 10.3% and 50%, respectively.  
2
 HDI stands for Human Development Index, and its calculation includes life expectancy, education, and income. 
Real_GDP_per_cap stands for Gross Domestic Product per capita at purchasing power parity. 
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As we can see in Table 3.3, the ordinary least squares regression of Real GDP per capita on both 
corporate income tax and sales tax threw that neither of these two independent variables had a 
significantly explanatory effect on Real GDP per capita (this from looking at the low t-ratios) and that 
even combined they fail to explain the dependent variable sufficiently (this from looking at the low F-
value). 
Table 3.3: Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-114 (n = 103) 
Missing or incomplete observations dropped: 11 
Dependent variable: Real_GDP_per_cap 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
                    coefficient   std. error   t-ratio   p-value 
  -------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const              15507.7        6508.59    2.383     0.0191  ** 
  Corporate_Income   1600.17       17746.6     0.09017   0.9283  
  Sales_Tax          12396.2       27441.3     0.4517    0.6524  
 
Mean dependent var   17934.10   S.D. dependent var   14780.78 
Sum squared resid    2.22e+10   S.E. of regression   14910.68 
R-squared            0.002300   Adjusted R-squared  -0.017654 
F(2, 100)            0.104794   P-value(F)           0.900609 
 
As we can see in Table 3.4, the ordinary least squares regression of Human Development Index on 
both corporate income tax and sales tax threw that only the latter independent variable explained the 
HDI with statistical sufficiency, but barely. The finding is similar for their combined amount of 
explanation. 
Table 3.4: Model 2: OLS, using observations 1-114 (n = 99) 
Missing or incomplete observations dropped: 15 
Dependent variable: HDI 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
                    coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const               0.710886    0.0586129    12.13     4.44e-021 *** 
  Corporate_Income   -0.300960    0.183212     -1.643    0.1037    
  Sales_Tax           0.524412    0.260912      2.010    0.0472    ** 
 
Mean dependent var   0.720657   S.D. dependent var   0.145072 
Sum squared resid    1.911409   S.E. of regression   0.141105 
R-squared            0.073252   Adjusted R-squared   0.053945 
F(2, 96)             3.109813   P-value(F)           0.049133 
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4. Additional Regressions. 
 Fearing that the two models from the previous section may suffer from “Omitted Variable Bias”, I 
decided to run them again but including Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index and the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as additional regressors. 
   Omitted variable bias occurs when two conditions are true: (1) the omitted variables are correlated 
with the included regressors –Corporate_Income and Sales_Tax-; and (2) the omitted variables are 
determinants of the dependent variables –Real_GDP_per_cap and HDI-. 
 The EFW is obtained annually by the Fraser Institute, which compiles the information provided by its 
Economic Freedom Network Members in 141 nations. It computation comprehends five areas or 
components: (1) Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes and Enterprises; (2) Legal Structure and 
Security of Property Rights; (3) Access to Sound Money; (4) Freedom to Trade Internationally; and (5) 
Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business.  
 The CPI (do not confuse with Consumer Price Index) is obtained annually by the Transparency 
International (TI) organization which defines “corruption” as the abuse of entrusted power for political 
gain.  The CPI measures the degree to which public sector corruption is perceived to exist in 178 
countries around the world. Its results are drawn from 13 surveys and assessments published by several 
independent institutions. 
 These two indices go in theory from 0 to 10, 0 being “very restricted” and 10 being “very free” for 
the EFW, and 0 being “highly corrupt” and 10 being “very clean” for the CPI. However, as we can see in 
Table 4.1, these ranges are in practice narrower: from 3.89 (Angola) to 9.05 (Hong Kong) for the EFW 
and from 1.4 (Afghanistan) to 9.3 (New Zealand) for the CPI. The distribution of EFW is skewed left and 
very concentrated, while CPI is skewed right and more spread. 
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics, using the observations 1 – 114 
(missing values were skipped) 
 
  EFW  CPI 
  Mean                 6.8348 4.6312 
  Median               7.0050 3.7000 
  Minimum              3.8900 1.4000 
  Maximum              9.0500 9.3000 
  Standard deviation   0.88138 2.2613 
  C.V.                 0.12895 0.48827 
  Skewness            -0.66390 0.70361 
  Ex. kurtosis         0.96868  -0.76829 
 
As we can see in Table 4.2, both of the additional regressors are highly correlated with both 
dependent variables (~70%), and somewhat correlated to at least one of the included regressors 
(~|20%|), suggesting indeed omitted variable bias in the models of the previous section. 
 
Table 4.2: Correlation Coefficients, using the observations 1 - 114 
(missing values were skipped) 
    EFW             CPI 
         -0.2796         -0.0309 Corporate_Income 
          0.0003          0.1475 Sales_Tax 
          0.7074          0.7384 HDI 
          0.6475          0.8371 Real_GDP_per_cap 
          1.0000          0.7345 EFW 
                          1.0000 CPI 
 
As we can see in Table 4.3, the joint explanation of the new OLS regression on Real_GDP_per_cap 
increased significantly (from 0.1 to 39.3 in F), but it is mostly attributed to CPI, who has the highest t-
ratio (8.46). The p-values of Corporate_Income and Sales_Tax decreased considerably (from 93% and 
65%, to 47% and 51%, respectively), but they are still too high to be considered statistically significant at 
any relevant confidence level. 
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Table 4.3: Model 3: OLS, using observations 1-114 (n = 93) 
Missing or incomplete observations dropped: 21 
Dependent variable: Real_GDP_per_cap 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
                 coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
const            -11110.0      9564.52     -1.162      0.2485    
Corporate_Income  6661.14      9238.78      0.7210     0.4728    
Sales_Tax        -11234.8      17105.0     -0.6568     0.5130    
EFW               432.465      1357.76      0.3185     0.7509    
CPI               5579.59      659.297      8.463      5.22e-013 *** 
 
Mean dependent var   18685.37   S.D. dependent var   15077.82 
Sum squared resid    5.84e+09   S.E. of regression   8149.497 
R-squared            0.720566   Adjusted R-squared   0.707865 
F(4, 88)             39.31380   P-value(F)           7.58e-19 
 
 
Finally, as we can see in Table 4.4, the joint explanation of the new OLS regression on HDI increased 
significantly (from 3.1 to 47.7 in F). Here it is also mostly attributed to CPI, who has the highest t-ratio 
(5.72); however, it is interesting to notice how the significance of the previously included explanatory 
variables has shifted from one to the other: Corporate_Income is now the one that is barely significant 
at a 5% confidence level, while Sales_Tax used to be so when the variables EFW and CPI were not 
present. 
 
 
Table 4.4: Model 4: OLS, using observations 1-114 (n = 92) 
Missing or incomplete observations dropped: 22 
Dependent variable: HDI 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1 
 
                   coefficient   std. error   t-ratio   p-value  
  -------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const             0.284787     0.160767      1.771    0.0800   * 
  Corporate_Income -0.254724     0.126763     -2.009    0.0476   ** 
  Sales_Tax         0.212814     0.196950      1.081    0.2829   
  EFW               0.0448527    0.0226930     1.977    0.0513   * 
  CPI               0.0338533    0.00592185    5.717    1.50e-07 *** 
 
Mean dependent var   0.725533   S.D. dependent var   0.144141 
Sum squared resid    0.731569   S.E. of regression   0.091700 
R-squared            0.613065   Adjusted R-squared   0.595275 
F(4, 87)             47.74349   P-value(F)           3.50e-21 
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5. Concluding Remarks. 
As stated in the introduction, and “proved” statistically throughout this paper, the final relationship 
between taxes and the welfare of the nation is ambiguous: In the case of Real GDP per capita, no 
significant explanation could be made just by the combination of corporate income tax and sales tax, 
and in the case of the Human Development Index, the explanation achieved by these two variables 
combined was barely significant according to statistical measures, and insignificant according to 
economic, stricter standards. 
When the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
were added as explanatory variables, the ordinary least squares regressions showed significant 
improvement in the overall explanation, mainly due to CPI. However, the independent variables 
previously included in the models remained basically insignificant, implying that their lack of explanatory 
power was not because of omitted variable bias. Therefore, tax rates are not determinant in the wealth 
of a nation. 
A government that spends most of its tax revenue on current expenditures (payrolls) and does not 
contribute sufficiently to the welfare of the economy by providing quality public goods and services that 
the private sector cannot convene to manage, will have a negative effect on the wealth of its nation, as 
the negative incentives of high taxation will not be compensated by the positive effects the tax collected 
can produce. 
On the contrary, a government that uses most of its tax revenue to supply quality public goods and 
services that the private sector cannot arrange to administer (rather than spending most of it on current 
expenditures), will have a net positive effect on the wealth of its nation, as the positive impacts the tax 
gathered can generate will more than make up for the negative incentives of high taxation. Thus, only 
then, the presence of the government would be beneficial on the net to the welfare of the economy.  
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